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Introduction*
The impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on host country economic growth has
received much attention over the last decade. The increased attention coincides with
expanding FDI flows and a renewed interest in the phenomenon within economic
research. Also the unsuccessful attempts to improve welfare levels in the least
developed countries through aid, in combination with significant reductions of such
economic assistance, may have called for further explanations to economic growth.
The 1999 World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 1999a) points out that FDI is of
major importance to economic development.1 FDI provides financial resources and
links to export markets. Furthermore, an inflow of foreign capital may contribute to
the upgrading of both managerial and technological effectiveness and improve human
capital. This way FDI may trigger industrialisation in developing countries.
Albeit a significant FDI inflow is no necessary condition to economic growth, the
theory is borne out by actual facts. Some of the newly industrialised countries in
South East Asia, like Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, as well as Hong Kong
experienced significant economic growth along with relatively high inward FDI levels
during the 1990s. The same did Argentina, Brazil and Poland. Unfortunately, the
theory is also supported by a lack of growth on the African continent in combination
with the lowest of FDI levels.
The South East Asian experience, the lack of growth on the African continent and the
19th century industrial growth in Europe, as well as in the USA, describe
industrialisation as a regional phenomenon. The observed pattern of growth in the
South East Asian countries is referred to as the “flying geese principal of
development” (Korhonen, 1994). Japan experienced rapid economic development and
became a leading country in the region. Due to increases in trade, FDI and
communication, Japan probably initiated industrialisation in several of its
neighbouring countries. The countries in the eastern and southern parts of Asia
                                                       
* I am grateful to Kjetil Bjorvatn and Line Tøndel for valuable comments.
1 FDI is “capital provided by a foreign direct investor (parent enterprise) to an affiliate enterprise in the
host country. It implies that the foreign direct investor exerts significant influence on the management
of the enterprise resident in the other economy. The capital provided can consist of equity capital,
reinvested earnings or intra company loans” (UNDP, 2000).
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followed suit and changed positions, according to economic growth, like flying geese.
How does such a regional procedure of industrialisation take place? What is the link
between FDI and industrialisation? These are questions motivating this paper.
Impacts of FDI on host economies
This paper explores some of the channels through which FDI may initiate
industrialisation. While a host economy is affected by FDI in a number of ways, the
following discussion is restricted to only two groups of externalities: Technology
transfer and industrial restructuring2.
‘Technology transfer’ due to FDI occurs when local companies or institutions adopt
technology applied by a multinational corporation (MNC). ‘Industrial restructuring’
takes place if the establishment of an MNC affiliate affects existing competition. Such
externalities are referred to as “spillover-effects”, and arise “… as a direct
consequence of the linkages forged between foreign direct investors and other
economic agents in the countries in which they operate” (Dunning, 1993). The
spillovers may be connected, and technology transfer may depend on the resulting
industrial structure. These terms are useful to explain a significant part of the
consequences of MNC entry into a market - consequences for different kinds of
economic agents, such as suppliers, customers, competitors and institutions with
which the MNC has direct dealings, as well as other institutions and firms in the
economy.
The welfare effects of FDI are not necessarily beneficial. At least in the short run, an
MNC that enters a foreign market through acquisitions of existing companies in order
to gain a monopolistic position exerts a negative effect on host country market
structure. As a part of a global MNC strategy, local export outlets may be closed
down. Furthermore, an MNC may introduce products claimed to have a negative
influence on local culture. A positive net outcome of inward FDI has proved to be
particularly uncertain in developing countries, where skilled labour is less available
and markets are smaller. Thus, a focus of this paper is the conditions necessary to
                                                       
2 Accordingly, an industrial organisation approach, focusing on externalities, is chosen. This may be
seen in contrast to a trade theoretical approach with emphasis on factor rewards, employment and
capital flows (Blomstrøm and Kokko, 1997).
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obtain favourable spillovers of FDI. Section 1 describes technology spillovers and the
channels through which they may occur. Adopting foreign invented technology is
generally beneficial for industrial development. Hence, the question is rather when the
technology is adopted and externalities generated. The topic of industrial
restructuring is attended in Section 2. An MNC entering new markets generally has
some influence on domestic industrial structure. The question related to this group of
externalities is how they may initiate industrial development. While technology
transfer is discussed topic by topic, the question of industrial restructuring is
approached by describing relevant theories. Section 3 briefly summarises the
conditions necessary to trigger industrial development by FDI.
1  Technology transfer
Technological invention is primarily undertaken in a limited number of developed
countries. There are seven OECD countries that account for 90% of all expenditures
on ‘research and development’ (R&D), the United States alone accounting for as
much as 40% (UNCTAD, 1999a). The inventions are transferred to other countries
through various channels. Most countries make thus an insignificant contribution to
the development of new technology. Adoption of foreign invented technology has
proved to be a condition for industrial development. Even though copyright and patent
fees are paid to some degree, the countries adopting foreign invented technology
“free-ride” on research investments made by others as the costs of innovative research
are evaded. In theory at least, this contributes to convergence of growth rates between
the technologically leading economies and the free-riding countries, or the ‘followers’
(Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997).
MNCs, FDI and technology transfer
Development of technology is expensive. As a consequence it tends to be
concentrated among large or specialised enterprises with surplus high enough to
finance the R&D, rather than being state funded. This implies that availability of
technology often is connected with multinational corporations (MNCs).
One might assume that technological spillovers are more likely to occur when an
MNC approaches a market through joint ventures or licensing rather than through
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FDI. In such cases a domestic company represents the MNC and applies its
technology.
This may be seen in contrast to FDI, where the MNC keeps the control and ownership
of human and physical capital within the corporation. However, the international
dissemination of technology is connected to investments rather than joint ventures and
licensing.
MNCs often prefer to enter a market through FDI rather then less obligatory
arrangements (licensing or joint ventures). Due to asymmetric information this is
particularly the case with technologically advanced products. Markusen (1995)
explains that an MNC has incentives not to reveal its process or product technology to
a potential licensee. The licensee could reject the contract, copy the technology and
become a competitor. Furthermore, it is difficult to write complete contracts as the
licensee and the MNC may have contradicting incentives. For instance, the licensee
may know more about market demand than the MNC. If demand is high, the MNC
might claim a larger share of the rents or produce directly. Hence, the licensee may
cause sales to be low even if demand is high. The licensee also has incentive to
produce at low cost and minor quality, and thus “free-ride” on the company’s
reputation. Accordingly, MNCs with the more attractive technology will generally
prefer to approach a new market through FDI.
Supporting this theory, the industrial pattern of FDI has shifted increasingly towards
technology-intensive activities. Furthermore, a large share of both licenses sales and
sales of technologically advanced products is directed towards MNC affiliates. Based
on data for Germany, Japan and the United States, UNCTAD (1999a) suggests that
between two-thirds and nine-tenths of international technology flows are intra-firm in
nature. Actually, as pointed out by Blomström and Kokko (1997), FDI seems to be
more significant for the geographical spread of technologies than sales of technology
to unrelated parties. Besides, informal contacts that result in technological spillovers
are easier and more important when an MNC affiliate is present in the market than
when contacts have to be made across international borders.
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Accordingly, technological spillovers are necessary for industrial development and
FDI by MNCs is important for such spillovers to occur. But what precisely are
technological spillovers? Through what channels do they occur? Some of the more
important effects are due to enhanced competition, employment of local workers,
demonstration of technology, and improved standards.
Improved competition
Foreign affiliates established by MNCs generally have a firm-specific advantage that
enables them to compete successfully with local companies despite the locals’
superior knowledge of local markets and culture (Dunning, 1993). MNCs are often
characterised by product differentiation and advanced technology. The MNC entry
may therefore provoke local companies to protect their profits, and hence increase
productivity. An increase in productivity may occur as existing technology and
resources are more efficiently exploited, by the use of new and more efficient
technology, or through the copying of technology used by the MNC. Spurred by the
geographical advantage local providers of intermediate goods may also try to
challenge foreign providers of inputs to the MNC affiliate. Hence, the production-
increasing spillovers may take place among suppliers, as well as final-goods-
producers.
Training of local workforce
Some training is usually necessary when MNCs hire the workforce locally. This
training range from on-the-job training to seminars and more formal education locally
or abroad, perhaps at the parent company. The instruction depends on the skills
needed and the level of employment. Furthermore, working in an MNC affiliate might
generate valuable experience for the locals. Skills vary from technological know-how
to quality controls, marketing and management. The beneficial spillovers to the host
economy take place as the employees move to other firms, or set up their own
businesses.
Demonstration effects
Blomström and Kokko (1997) point out that the MNC affiliate may be of importance
in terms of technology diffusion as it demonstrates the existence and profitability of
new products and processes. Possible scepticism among local companies toward new
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innovations may be reduced, making the adoption of new technology appear less
risky.
A second demonstration effect is related to standards. An MNC may have higher
demands according to standards on inputs, quality control, security and labour rights.
High standards represent a more indirect way to improve productivity. If this has been
neglected by domestic companies, demands and demonstration by MNCs may lead
domestic companies to adopt similar standards, or governments to introduce codes
according to various standards.
The generation of spillovers is not obvious
The degree of technology transfer and the benefits thereof are difficult to measure, as
the effects are both complex and dynamic. As has been mentioned already, FDI may
also have negative impacts on the host economy. Also, the beneficial net outcome is
stated to be less certain once the host economy is a developing country. In general,
FDIs have become more technology intensive, R&D in foreign affiliates has risen and
intra-firm flows of technology have increased. However, these are features
characterising FDI in developed countries. We do not observe the same trends in most
developing countries. Accordingly, the sophistication of technologies in developing
countries is not increasing at the same pace as in the case of developed countries. A
reflection of this is that FDI in developing countries first and foremost represents
inflows of finance and knowledge of organisational and managerial practices, rather
than new or more modern product and process technologies (UNCTAD, 1999).
Hence, the spillovers depend on the degree to which technology is actually introduced
in the host economy. Technology transfer involves both the transfer of physical goods
and the transfer of knowledge. The latter requiring skills and efforts, representing a
cost that rise inversely proportional to the level of technological capabilities. The
MNC will choose a level of technology transfer that is profitable to the entire
company. This implies that if the educational level in the host country is low, the
technology transferred is less sophisticated. Accordingly, UNCTAD (1999) predicts
that:  “…globalisation may result in growing inequality in TNC3 technology transfers
                                                       
3 Transnational Corporation
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between countries. Since each affiliate has to compete in world markets, host
countries with low capabilities and weak learning systems may be left progressively
behind those with dynamic capabilities.”
Furthermore, the level of technology transfer depends on the aim behind the FDI.
Horizontal FDI, when the MNC affiliate produce to supply a local market in a host
country, is supposed to generate more spillovers than vertical investments. However,
if the host economy is a developing country, the efforts to match costs and quality to
world standards may be limited. In such cases only simple technology, demanding a
very low skill base, might be introduced. The spillover effects tend to be weaker for
vertical FDIs because the aim of the MNC primarily is to apply cheap labour and
export the goods. Most likely the production technology that is sourced out has to fit
with the existing capabilities of local labour, instead of upgrading the labour force.
The spillovers also depend on the links between the MNC affiliate and the rest of the
economy. For instance, MNC production in “export processing zones” (EPZs,
established to attract FDI by offering special advantages, often tax holidays and duty
free imports), seems to create few positive spillovers to the host economy. Production
in such zones is mainly vertical, applying imported intermediates, aimed at export.
The know-how transferred to local workers tends to be generated through on-the-job
training, and the learning effects are limited. On the other hand, technology-
transferring links between the MNC and the rest of the economy tends to be stronger
if some industry already exists within the relevant sector. In general, they will also be
stronger if the affiliate adds to existing competition, local supplied intermediates are
applied, the geographical distance between MNC affiliate and other industry is small,
and production aims at the local market as opposed to export (Bjorvatn, 2000a).
Furthermore, to be able to efficiently take advantage of the technological expertise of
foreign MNCs, some host country policy implementations are recommended. A
governmental technological strategy has to be developed in order to upgrade the level
of human skills. Rather than create EPZs and similar incentives to attract FDI,
governments should accumulate location-specific assets and develop well-functioning
institutions (Nordås, 2000). Accordingly, Dunning (1993) points out that the host
country has to provide “… the scientific and communications infrastructure that high
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technology MNCs regard as the sine qua non for their full participation in the
countries in which they invest”.
2 New industrial structures
Technology transfers may improve the efficiency and hence the profitability of local
firms. However, both technology and welfare spillovers depend on domestic markets.
There is a risk that MNCs crowd out local business rather than enhance competition.
Crowding out occurs if a 1$ investment by a foreign affiliate leads to an increase of
the total investment level by less than 1$. On the other hand, if foreign affiliates
stimulates new investment in downstream or upstream production, total investment
may increase by more than 1$, the FDI thus resulting in a ‘crowding in’ effect. This
may be the case once the foreign affiliate increases the demand for locally produced
inputs. Production of a greater variety of specialised inputs may be initiated, thus
generating a positive externality to other final-good producers. This is the concept of
backward linkages. If a result is commencement of local production of more complex
goods at competitive costs, forward linkages have been materialised and industrial
development may occur4.
Under which circumstances are favourable industrial linkage effects expected to
materialise in a developing country? How and when will they commence industrial
development? These questions are approached by the presentation of three theories:
(1) Puga and Venables (1999) describe industrialisation of one country as an interplay
with countries exhibiting different levels of industrialisation, (2) Rodriguez-Clare
(1996) explains the generation of linkages by MNCs, while (3) Markusen and
Venables (1999) go more deeply into the changes of industrial structure due to FDI.
The three theories explain development as a result of industrial links generated by
foreign enterprises, though at different levels. While differences in human and
physical resources are still deemed important, these three theories represent
abstractions from the notion of comparative advantages.
                                                       
4 The definitions of ‘crowding in’ and ‘crowding out’ are provided by UNCTAD (1999a). The
explanations of backward and forward linkages stem from Rodriguez-Clare (1996).
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Diffusion of industrial development across countries
Puga and Venables (1999) explain forces conducive to the stepwise spread of
industries from one country to another. The forces in focus are differences in initial
level of industrialisation and in demand for manufactured goods. Considering a group
of countries in the paper, the model operates with two countries. There are transport
costs or trade barriers between these countries. The presence of industrial linkages, as
well as the costs of international trade, motivates companies to agglomerate.
Manufacturing companies operate in a market characterised by monopolistic
competition. Experiencing increasing returns to scale, these companies are profit
maximising on where to locate production. The two countries are assumed to be
similar in underlying characteristics. They have the same amount of capital and land
per unit labour, and are featured by the same institutional structure. Roughly retold,
the industrial diffusion from one country (A) to another (B) takes place as follows:
i) All manufacturing is concentrated in country A. World demand for manufacturing
rises relatively more than demand in other sectors, resulting in economic growth for
country A. This increases the wage differences between country A and country B,
implicating that country B-production costs decline relatively.
ii) Agglomorated production in country A generates externalities, like upstream and
downstream linkages, between producers. Such connections may imply that a move of
production to low-wage countries is not necessarily profitable (linkage effect).
Transport costs and barriers to country B-import of intermediate goods make
production in country B even less profitable.
iii) The two forces in operation are contradictory. For investments and
industrialisation to be initiated in country B, the wage effect has to exceed the linkage
effect. The profit associated of moving production increases the larger is the wage gap
between the two countries. It will also increase should barriers to trade be reduced, as
intermediates would have to be imported for country B production. Finally, the return
on FDI depends on local demand for industrial produced goods, consumer goods as
well as intermediates. Initially this demand is low in country B, however it is expected
to increase with industrial development. Puga and Venables simulate the model
extended to four countries. Simultaneous industrialisation of all the countries is not
found to be a stable equilibrium. If one country got slightly ahead of the others then
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its lead would cumulate. As a result, only one of the other countries gains
manufacturing, country B.
iv) By the presence of some manufacturing, backward and forward linkages are
created in country B. Country A experiences a loss of manufacturing. The wage gap
narrows and the two countries become more similar in economic terms.
v) Continuing growth and demand for industrial goods raise real wages in country A
and B relative to the other countries. Industrialisation spreads to the rest of the group
if the wage effect of moving out production is stronger than the linkage effect.
The generation of industrial linkages
Rodriguez-Clare (1996) bases his theory on three assumptions: (1) A variety of
specialised inputs enhance productivity; (2) the proximity of supplier and user is
necessary for production of intermediate goods; and (3) the size of the market limits
the available variety of specialised inputs. He applies a two-country model. Country A
is more developed, producing complex goods with a variety of specialised inputs and
at high wage levels. In country B simple goods are produced and wages are lower.
There is monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods market. Intermediate
goods are non-tradable, and only MNCs have access to input from both countries. In
order to reduce marginal production costs, companies in country A have incentives to
become international, locating headquarter in country A and production in country B,
applying inputs from both countries.
The impacts of MNCs on the developing country depend on the linkages generated by
MNCs compared to the linkages that would be generated by domestic firms.
Rodriguez-Clare aims at measuring these effects through the labour market, defining a
linkage coefficient. This coefficient is defined as the ratio of employment generated in
upstream industries, through demand for specialised inputs, to the labour hired
directly by the firm. A positive linkage effect implies an increase of intermediate
goods production, which is the case when the MNC has a higher linkage coefficient
compared to domestic firms. A negative linkage effect, to the contrary, would imply a
decrease in the productivity of domestic firms and a consequent decrease in wage
levels.
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Whether the effect is favourable or not in a country B-perspective, depends on MNC
demand for locally produced inputs. This demand is determined by several factors.
High transportation costs between the countries enhance incentives to apply locally
produced intermediates and decrease the import of inputs from country A.
Consequently, the linkage effect of MNCs is increasing in transportation costs, and
MNCs headquartered at distant locations will generate more linkages than MNCs
originating in neighbouring countries. Communication costs between headquarter and
production plant is thus also of importance, as a significant share of specialised inputs
is information.
Furthermore, the industrial linkage effects are determined by the technology applied
in the MNC production process. A complex technology may demand a greater variety
of inputs, and more favourable spillovers are generated. A third factor is the level of
development in both of the countries. A host country that already provides a certain
variety of intermediates would probably attract linkage-creating FDI despite high
transportation costs. However, when local supply of intermediates is poor, it is more
likely that the host country will attract MNCs with low transportation costs or MNCs
that apply less specialised intermediates. Linkage effects due to multinationals
locating in poor regions may therefore be limited. Rodriguez-Clare also finds that the
demand for country B inputs is decreasing in the country A variety of specialised
inputs. As a result, MNCs from more developed countries may benefit the host
economies less than MNCs from less developed countries.
The impact of industrial linkages
Rodriguez-Clare focuses on the share of locally produced intermediates in MNC
production and the importance of this share to the generation of linkage effects.
Assuming a certain share of locally produced intermediates in MNC production,
Markusen and Venables (1999) describe more thoroughly the changes in industrial
structure due to inward FDI. The changes are determined by the interaction between
two effects, the competition effect and the linkage effect. The establishment of one or
more MNCs increases competition in domestic markets, reducing the profits of local
producers. However, the increase of consumer market producers may increase total
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demand for locally produced inputs (backward linkages), resulting in lower
production costs for local companies, as well as for multinationals (forward linkages).
These effects are described in a singel-economy model comprising a downstream and
an upstream industry. MNCs, foreign (exporters) and domestic firms are represented
in the final goods market, characterised by imperfect competition. Intermediates are
produced by domestic firms only. Profit in the intermediate goods market is affected
by demand, as the firms experience increasing returns to scale. Demand for an
intermediate good is determined by a price index for inputs relevant to the industry,
the price for the specific good, product differentiation, as well as total local demand
for intermediates. The price index falls when a company enters the industry. Demand
for consumer goods is domestic only and, similar to the upstream industry,
determined by the degree of product differentiation, prices, a price index, but also by
the elasticity of demand with respect to the price index and the position of the
domestic demand curve. Input requirement and an efficiency parameter are included
in the downstream industry profit functions, representing impacts of technology on
linkage effects. Input requirements may vary between multinationals and local
companies.
The magnitude of the linkage effects depends on the increase of input producers due
to MNC entry. This is determined by domestic demand for MNC produced goods and
the share of locally produced inputs that are applied in production. Increases in
demand for goods produced by domestic firms and inputs applied in domestic firm
production are factors that also increase the intermediate goods demand. However,
linkage effects due to FDI are reduced by these factors.
The substitution of domestic final goods producers, the competition effect, is
determined by the resulting profit in the final goods market. A common result of an
MNC entry is a reduction of this profit. Perhaps the MNC produces goods at lower
costs, or a surplus of goods supply may reduce prices. The reduction of profit may
force domestic industry to leave the market. Domestic producers will probably be
more protected the higher is the degree of product differentiation. The competition
effect is also reduced if MNC entry replaces imports, or if a large share of the
production is exported.
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Whether the effects of FDI is favourable or not, depends on the proportional
magnitudes of the linkage effect versus the competition effect, as well as how these
effects are connected. An MNC presence that crowds out all existing domestic
companies would result in monopoly and the competition effect would fail to appear.
Furthermore, multinational production based on a large share of imported inputs could
actually decrease local intermediate goods demand, thus inhibiting favourable linkage
effects. However, in a case where several MNCs enter a market, linkage effects can
be generated in spite of a complete crowding out effect. And if MNC entry leads to an
increase of intermediate goods production, the profits of domestic firms may increase,
resulting in a rise in the number of domestic producers. This forward linkage
increases demand for inputs even more, and a larger variety of inputs becomes
available. The entry conditions for domestic (and multinational) companies improve
and may result in a “crowding in” effect. Accordingly, FDI may act as a catalyst for
industrial development.
3 Summary:  When do beneficial spillovers occur?
The subject of the previous sections is whether FDI may serve as a force towards
industrial development of the host economies. This section serves as a summary that
aims at identifying the more relevant factors in the discussion.
The generation of backward linkages is one of the beneficial effects of FDI. These
spillovers are manifested in terms of increased demand for locally supplied
intermediates. However, the use of domestically produced inputs in MNC production
depends on several factors, such as the requirement of inputs in the specific FDI
project. Also, necessary inputs have to be produced locally, quality must be
satisfactory, and prices must be competitive as compared to import. This is the case
for services as well as for goods. Furthermore, the local share of inputs may increase
gradually. Both local industry and the MNC affiliate need some time to adjust to new
conditions.
Import of intermediates is dependent on trade barriers and costs of transportation.
Barriers to import increase the price of imported inputs, making it profitable to use
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local suppliers. However, if local suppliers are unable to offer required inputs or if
export of final goods is important, low trade barriers might be a necessary condition
for FDI. This is also in accordance with the observed growth of FDI that takes place
concurrently with reductions in trade costs.
The impact on technological capability, as well as managerial and organisational
competence in the host economy, depends mainly on characteristics of the FDI
project, the spread of a local network, employment of local labour, and local skills.
These factors are interlinked. The establishment of highly advanced production (of
goods or services) demands a skilled workforce. If host country level of education is
low the cost of training is higher, and the investment may not take place. The need for
skilled labour is generally lower if the FDI is vertical, in contrast to production of a
complete product. Furthermore, technology transfer depends on the quantity of goods
and services bought locally and hence employment generated in upstream industries.
This network tends to be more significant if MNC production is horizontal and is
aimed at host country markets, compared to vertical production established for
exports.
Generally, the establishment of MNC affiliates will affect host economy industrial
structure. Increased competition is believed to enhance productivity and thereby
economic development. However, it is also in the interest of host countries to protect
existing industry. The number and size of local firms in the market, their present and
potential economic performance, as well as their innovatory capacity determine the
competition effect. Furthermore, local producers are protected by the degree of
product differentiation and protectionistic policies, such as subsidies. If FDI replaces
imports the competition effect is less significant, compared to introduction of new
goods. The resulting competition does also depend on market strategies of the MNC
and the type of investment. Greenfield investment tends to improve competition,
while mergers and aquisitions may reduce the number of firms, thus hampering
competition.
Finally, beneficial spillover effects and enhancement of industrial development are
dependent on governmental strategies. Such strategies are diverged: Governments
may determine a range of entry conditions in order to protect domestic industry and
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culture. Alternatively, a strategy may be developed to attract FDI, for instance by
fiscal incentives and export processing zones. Developing countries, aiming at capital
inflows and industrial development, often choose the latter. This has resulted in “FDI
competition” where countries try to offer the best policy conditions to attract MNCs.
This competition has been labelled “a race to the bottom” as countries, contrary to
their objectives, competitively reduce the possibilities of obtaining capital inflows and
beneficial spillover-effects due to FDI. Cooperation across borders in the development
of investment strategies seems to be the way out of this fruitless “competition”.
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Summary
ISSN 0804-3639
Countries within a region often experience a similar rate of
industrial development. Do foreign direct investments have
any influence on this aspect of industrialisation? This paper
describes how technology transfer and new industrial structures
may accelerate industrialisation, with particular focus on the
conditions for beneficial spillovers.
